

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 19, 2013

MEMO TO: Steven Stokes, Acting Technical Director
FROM: Thomas Spatz, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Report for Week Ending April 19, 2013

Positive Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Determination for Incomplete Impact

Analysis: This week, B&W Pantex upgraded the Potential Inadequacy of the Safety Analysis (PISA) issued last week for the incomplete falling man impact analysis, to a positive USQ. (See report for 4/12/13.) The incomplete impact analysis only affects one weapon program and B&W Pantex continues to pause disassembly operations on that program.

High Pressure Fire Loop Hazard Control Violation: This week, B&W Pantex declared a Hazard Control violation when they discovered a valve in the high pressure fire loop (HPFL) that they had never performed surveillance on. B&W Pantex never performed surveillance on this valve because it was not on the system design drawing and was not labeled above ground as an HPFL valve. The valve was simply labeled as water, on the above-ground indicator and was assumed to be part of the domestic water system. B&W Pantex discovered the valve after replacing a section of the HPFL, and left what was believed to be a dead leg of the piping open. Water began flowing out the open piping when they went to restore water to the new section of piping. B&W Pantex held an event critique this week and will hold a causal analysis and mistake proofing meeting next week.

Anomalous Unit: B&W Pantex has paused operations in one facility since late February 2013 due to an anomalous unit. (See reports for 3/1/13, 3/8/13, 3/15/13, and 4/5/13.) This week, NNSA performed a Nuclear Explosive Safety Change Evaluation (NCE) related to B&W maintenance personnel performing planned maintenance on the fire suppression system with the anomalous unit in the facility. The NCE team concluded their review with no findings. B&W Pantex will proceed with the planned maintenance. The NNSA project team for this anomalous unit plans to convene again next week to determine the path forward for this unit.

Assessment of Authorization Basis (AB) Department Performance: The NNSA Production Office (NPO) issued a report on the assessment of B&W Pantex documented safety analysis (DSAs) and technical safety requirements (TSRs) development process. The assessment was conducted by the NNSA Office of the Associate Administrator for Safety and Health, Office of Operations and Safety Engineering (NA-SH-50). The assessment team looked at five criteria to evaluate the single objective of B&W's DSA and TSR development process. The one criteria that was not met was that the B&W Pantex AB department is fully staffed with qualified subject matter experts to implement the DSA/TSR development, review, and submittal process. The report noted that in the past year four experienced AB analysts have left the department, and in less than two years there have been three AB department managers and three Engineering division managers. The report also noted that the corrective actions B&W Pantex is taking to address the two NPO letters titled *AB Department Performance* and *Adverse Trend of Qualified Staff Shortages within the AB Department* should continue to be addressed. (See report for 10/5/12.) The assessment team identified no other issues.